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THE EMPLOYMENT LAW YEAR IN REVIEW
JUNE 2004-JUNE 2005
Judith M. Conti*
INTRODUCTION

Between June 2004 and June 2005, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
(D.C. Court of Appeals) heard a number of cases involving various employment
laws. While the Court did not issue any earth-shattering decisions during this
time period, such as ones in which employees rights were radically expanded or
cut back, the Court issued a number of well-reasoned opinions that clarified
many existing laws and regulations, and offered better guidance to parties involved in employment disputes and their attorneys. Significantly, the Court
showed a regular proclivity to engage in a very strict and literal reading of statutes and regulations in making its decisions. In many instances, this approach
helps to give litigants and their attorneys greater certainty about their rights.
The District of Columbia is a jurisdiction that is generally more protective of
workers' rights than many other jurisdictions. For the most part, the decisions
issued this year bore witness to that fact, particularly in the context of workers'
compensation law. However, in all instances discussed below, the Court applied
an even hand, paid close attention to the plain language of applicable laws, and
exercised a good deal of common sense in reaching its decisions.
This article provides a concise chronicle of some of the employment decisions
handed down by the D.C. Court of Appeals between June of 2004 and 2005. The
discussions are arranged thematically, starting first with cases involving the D.C.
Human Rights Act,' which is one of the more heavily litigated employment laws
in the District of Columbia. The article then discusses the workers' compensation
decisions from the same time period. Because the District has a vibrant public
sector, employing many people in its various agencies, the Office of Employee
Appeals hears many appeals of various and sundry employment actions each
year, and it is no surprise that some have found their way to the Court of Appeals. Finally, the article concludes with a discussion of the remaining miscellaneous cases that defy easy categorization.
* Judith M. Conti is the Co-Founder and Director of the D.C. Employment Justice Center, a
non-profit organization whose mission is to secure, protect and promote workplace justice in the D.C.
metropolitan area. Ms. Conti is a 1994 graduate of William and Mary Law School and a 1991 graduate
of Williams College. In addition to practicing law and directing the EJC, Ms. Conti is an adjunct
professor of law and a 2003 inductee into the Public Interest Hall of Fame. Ms. Conti was ably assisted
in researching and preparing this article by Jocelyn Cortez, who is a 2006 graduate of the University of
Arizona Law School. Ms. Cortez was a law clerk at the EJC during the summer of 2005.
1 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1401.01, 2-1411.06 (2006).
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I.

THE

D.C.

HUMAN RIGHTs ACT

The issue of legal damages is one that is often hotly contested. On a national
level, politicians argue over damage caps in order to rein in what are considered
to be "runaway juries." Many argue that judges are in a better position to assess
reasonable damages as opposed to jurors who may bring their own biases, personal experiences or lack of relevant context to the process of determining damages for legal violations. In many instances, however, administrative agencies,
either in the form of Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) or a board, also award
damages that can later be the subject of controversy. The D.C. Court of Appeals
recently reviewed such a case.
In PsychiatricInstitute of Washington v. District of Columbia Commission on
Human Rights,2 Intervener/Cross-Petitioner Ric Birch worked at the Psychiatric
Institute of Washington (PIW) as a clinical coordinator and later as an intake
therapist.3 During his employment, Birch was sexually harassed by his supervisor,
Brenda Harris.4 Birch complained to the Human Resources Director, but she was
generally non-responsive. 5 After Birch made his complaint, Harris' harassment of
Birch became more severe and did not cease until she left P1W. 6 During the
period of harassment, Birch suffered a loss of energy and appetite and had
problems sleeping. He was eventually diagnosed with a permanent major depressive disorder, and was prescribed anti-depressants on which he could become dependent for life. A PIW expert affirmed this diagnosis and added that this type of
depression is a common result of sexual harassment.7
About a year after Harris left PIW, Birch filed a complaint under the D.C.
Human Rights Act with the D.C. Commission on Human Rights, the predecessor
to the current Office of Human Rights, alleging discrimination by PIW on the
basis of gender and sexual orientation.8 The Commission ruled in Birch's favor
on the sexual harassment charge, finding that PIW did not take effective steps to
stop the harassment. However, the Commission did not rule in his favor on the
complaint of sexual orientation discrimination. 9 PIW then stipulated to liability
and agreed to adjudicate the issue of damages only. 10 The hearing examiner ultimately recommended an award of $1,134,426.53 in damages, plus attorneys' fees
and costs. The Commission remitted the award to $900,000.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

871 A.2d 1146 (D.C. 2005).
Id. at 1148.
Id.
Id. at 1149-50.
Id. at 1150.
Id.
Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1148-49.
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On appeal to the D.C. Court of Appeals, PIW argued, for the first time, that
Birch did not file his complaint with the Commission within the one-year statute
of limitations.1 1 PIW also contested the amount of the award. On the issue of
damages, the Court affirmed the Commission's award of damages, in all respects.
In calculating the amount of damages, PIW contended that the Commission erred
when it considered Harris' retaliation after Birch complained to Human Resources. However, the Court held that "conduct retaliatory in nature is relevant
to a hostile work environment claim whether or not it would support a separate
statutory retaliation claim, so long as the claimant does not recover under both
counts." 12 In particular, the Court relied on Sections 211.1 and 211.2 of the D.C.
Code of Municipal Regulations, which put forth various factors to consider when
determining damages in such cases. 13 Specifically, Section 211.2 lists "sexual...
epithets regarding the complainant; ... [o]ccurence of the unlawful discriminatory acts ... publicly, or within the knowledge of the awardee's family, friends,
peers or acquaintances; and ....[w]illfullness, recklessness, or repetition of the
unlawful discriminatory acts or practices . . . "as aggravating factors, and the

Court found that all these factors were present in this case. 14 In light of the medical and other evidence presented, the award did not exceed the limits of a "rea15
sonable range" of compensation for the permanent injuries Birch proved.
Therefore, the Court affirmed the Commission's award of damages as well as
damages for embarrassment, humiliation, indignity, and pain and suffering, rea16
soning that there was substantial medical evidence to establish such damages.
The Court also affirmed the Commission's remitter of the hearing examiner's
recommended award, holding that because the examiner's recommendation is no
more than that - a recommendation the Commission was within its discretion to
"guard against awards inflated beyond what the circumstances would justify" and
reduce the award.1 7
Although remitted, the award given by the Commission was still quite generous. As the Court of Appeals made clear, when the Commission, now the Office
of Human Rights (OHR), can properly justify its awards, such damage awards
will be affirmed. This case is instructive to local employment law practitioners in
that it outlines in some degree of detail the type, quantity, and quality of evidence
that will help sustain an award of damages. Both plaintiffs' and defendants' attor11 Id. at 1151 (dismissing the statute of limitations argument, holding that it was waived because
it was not raised before the Commission and because Birch did file his charge within the proscribed
time period).
12 Id. at 1152 (citation omitted).
13 D.C. MUN. REoS. tit. 4, §§ 211.1, 211.2 (2004).
14 PsychatricInstitute of Washington, 871 A.2d at 1153.
15 Id. at 1154 (quoting Louison v. Crockett, 546 A.2d 400, 404 (D.C. 1988)).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1155.
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neys should read this decision carefully and not overlook the necessity of presenting substantial and relevant evidence of damages when litigating before the
OHR.
Many employment laws, such as the wage and hour laws, have explicit exemptions that place certain types of employees outside the protection of that particular law. In addition, over the years, courts have enunciated certain common law
exemptions to various employment laws. One such exemption that is often applied to anti-discrimination employment laws is the "ministerial exception." Last
year, the Court of Appeals examined the contours of this exception as applied to
the D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA). 18 Kathleen Pardue, a former principal at
Saint Francis Xavier Elementary School, sued the Archdiocese of Washington,
alleging that its Executive Director was engaging in a "campaign to eliminate
Caucasian principals and replace them with less-qualified African-American
principals." 19 The defendant moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Free
Exercise and Establishment clauses of the First Amendment removed subject
matter jurisdiction over this case from the Court because the matter was essentially an "ecclesiastical dispute.",20 The Court allowed discovery as to this issue
only, and after reviewing the materials produced during discovery, the21Court dismissed Pardue's complaint, as barred by the "ministerial exception.",
This exception, recognized by a large number of courts, is based on the Free
Exercise clause of the First Amendment and "precludes civil courts from adjudicating employment discrimination claims by ministers against the church or religious institution employing them."'22 To determine who falls under this exception,
courts have administered the "primary duties" test, holding that "if the employee's primary duties consist of teaching, [and] spreading the faith" or any
other "supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship, he or she
should be considered 'clergy.' ,23
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that Pardue's "primary
duties" made her subject to the ministerial exemption, which would bar her claim
under the DCHRA.2 4 Although Pardue argued that her job consisted primarily
of administrative duties, the Court held that the record clearly established that
her secular responsibilities were "inextricably intertwined in the school's [religious] mission and in the principal's role in fulfilling it."'25 In addition, the Court
18
19
20
21
22
23
1985)).
24
25
anyone

Pardue v. Ctr. City Consortium, 875 A.2d 669 (D.C. 2005) (citation omitted).
Id. at 671.
Id.
Id. at 671-72.
Id. at 672 (quoting EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
Id. (quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.
Id.
Id. at 677 ("[Sjhe was . . . principal of a Roman Catholic school, and thus she, more than
else at the school except the pastor.., was answerable to the religious authorities for provid-
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was not persuaded by Pardue's contention that the pastor of the sponsoring
church parish had the final authority over the school. The Court held that, even if
true, the hierarchical scheme of religious decision-making does not bar the exception from applying, especially when the record demonstrated that both Pardue
and the pastor shared equal responsibilities for religious education at the
school.2 6 Finally, based on the ministerial exception, the Court also affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of two breach of contract claims as well as Pardue's claim
for unpaid wages, which was barred by the relevant statute of limitations.27
Pardue is an expansive, though not unduly expansive, reading of the ministerial exception to the Human Rights Act. It is clear from this case that the First
Amendment protection of religious freedom is of paramount importance when
an employee works at a religious institution. Although this is not an exception
that is applied to every or even most employees of a religious institution, plaintiffs' attorneys who are contacted by high level employees of such institutions
would be wise to read this decision carefully before deciding to take on a case of
this nature.
The last relevant case decided under the DCHRA in the last year is Jung v.
George Washington University.28 Though not an employment case, the Court
gives some important guidance in Jung on what is considered relevant and admissible evidence in the context of proving a discrimination claim. Kwangho Jung, a
Korean graduate student at George Washington University, needed to pass a
comprehensive written and oral examination in order to be eligible to write a
dissertation leading to a Ph.D.2 9 After failing the examination twice, Jung filed a
lawsuit against the University, alleging discrimination on the basis of race and
national origin, in violation of the DCHRA.30 The parties ultimately settled the
case, and Jung was reinstated into the Ph.D. program. He took the comprehensive exam for a third time, which he again failed. 3 '
Once more, Jung filed suit against the University, alleging discrimination
based on race, retaliation for his prior complaints, and breach of the settlement
agreement. After the jury returned a verdict in the University's favor on the discrimination claim and the judge directed a verdict against Jung on all other
counts, Jung then filed an appeal.32
ing, in myriad ways not reducible to a listing of tasks, 'spiritual leadership in and for the school
community."').
26 Id. at 677-78.
27 Id. at 678-79.
28 875 A.2d 95 (D.C. 2005).
29 Id. at 101.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 101-02.
32 Id. at 100.
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Relevant to employment cases generally, Jung asked the judge for a jury instruction on direct evidence of discrimination. At "unspecified times," one of
Jung's four examination reviewers admitted that he expressed his opinion to the
other reviewers that "Korean students tended to engage in rote learning and to
state the material verbatim on examination without analysis or responsiveness to
the question., 33 Jung argued that this was direct evidence of discriminatory animus and asked the judge to instruct the jury that when a plaintiff offers direct
evidence of discrimination, he must only show that the discrimination "was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other motives also motivated the practice.",34 The trial court refused to give this instruction, finding that
there was insufficient direct evidence to warrant such an instruction.
The Court of Appeals agreed, noting that:
[A] plaintiff claiming direct evidence of discrimination has a heavy burden,
for not every comment reflecting discriminatory attitudes will support an
inference that it was a factor motivating the adverse decision. Stray remarks
in the workplace and statement by decision makers that are unrelated to the
decision making process are not considered sufficient to satisfy the direct
evidence burden. Such statements may be too attenuated because not directed at the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff must present evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision making process that
may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude ....
sufficient to permit the factfinder to infer that [the] attitude was more likely
than not a motivating factor in [the alleged adverse action.]3 5
In light of this standard, the Court held that Jung failed to meet his burden of
establishing direct evidence of discrimination sufficient to support the requested
jury instruction. He presented no evidence showing a temporal nexus or a causal
link between some of the statements and the grading of his examination. 36 The
Court further held there was no evidence that the remarks were made at or near
the time of his exam; there was no showing that this reviewers statements were
related to his evaluation of Jung's exam; and there was no evidence that the re37
marks influenced the other three reviewers who also gave him a failing grade.
Under these circumstances, Jung did not have sufficient direct evidence of discrimination to warrant the issuance of the jury instruction.
As the Court made clear in this decision, the threshold for establishing direct
evidence of discrimination, whether on the job, in an educational context, or in
other contexts such as housing, is not one that can be easily reached. Not only
33

Id. at 110.

34

Id. at 111 (citations omitted).

35
36
37

Id.
Id. at 112.
Id.
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must the evidence show discriminatory animus on its face, but it must also have
both a close temporal and causal link to the claimed discriminatory, event. As
with all discrimination claims, which often come down to one person's word
against another's, plaintiffs will always have an uphill battle. This case highlights
the importance of collecting disparate and diverse types of evidence, including
examples of how similarly and non-similarly situated employees are treated,
statements made by decision makers, and comprehensive information about the
plaintiff's job performance.

II.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Unfortunately, people are sometimes injured while performing their duties of
employment. The possibility of injury is greater when job duties involve physical
labor or when working in old buildings containing environmental hazards such as
asbestos or lead paint. Workers' compensation litigation is a busy field, so it is no
surprise that the Court of Appeals decided a number of cases involving workers'
compensation last year.
One common issue in workers' compensation litigation is the standard of sufficiency with regard to the amount of medical evidence needed by an employer to
rebut the statutory presumption of causation between a worker's disability and
an injury suffered at work. In June 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a decision
38
in Washington Post v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
that helped to elucidate this standard.
Raymond Reynolds worked as a mailroom employee for The Washington Post
("The Post"). He filed a claim for temporary total disability benefits after sustaining an injury to his knee at work during the prior year.39 More specifically,
Reynolds claimed that he aggravated a pre-existing arthritic condition in his left
knee after jumping off a forklift in an effort to stop a pallet of newspapers from
4°
tipping over.
Reynolds presented medical records documenting that he suffered from an
underlying degenerative knee condition that had been deteriorating for some
quite some time, but his doctors agreed that the latest injury was directly caused
by the incident described above.41 Based on this evidence, the hearing examiner
ruled that Reynolds could invoke the presumption that there was a causal relationship between his disability and the knee injury he sustained while jumping off
the forklift.4 2 The burden then shifted to The Post to present "substantial evi38
39
40
41
42

852 A.2d 909, 910 (D.C. 2004).
Id. at 911.
Id.
Id. at 912.
Id.

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICr OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

dence, both specific and comprehensive enough, to sever the presumptive relationship" between Reynolds' disability and his injury at work.43
The Post then submitted deposition testimony and written reports of an orthopedic surgeon who had examined Reynolds and reviewed his medical records at
The Post's request. 4 This physician stated that neither this forklift injury nor
another prior injury Reynolds sustained, had contributed to his disability. 45 The
physician reported the disability was attributable solely to the natural progression
of Reynolds's pre-existing knee disease.4 6 The hearing examiner rejected this report, and the Court of Appeals held the hearing examiner "gave short shrift to
what she dismissively characterized - without any explanation - as [the doctor's]
speculative and partial opinion.", 47 After the Director of the Department of Employment Services affirmed the hearing examiner's decision, The Post appealed. 48
The Court of Appeals agreed with The Post, finding the doctor's opinion "indisputably constituted 'substantial medical evidence [... ] to rebut the statutory
presumption."' 4 9 In particular, the Court noted that the doctor personally examined Reynolds, examined "all of the pertinent medical records," gave a "firm
and unambiguous" opinion, and "supported it with detailed reasons." 50 All of
these factors led the Court to conclude that The Post presented medical evidence
that was "specific and comprehensive enough" to rebut the presumption of causation. 51 Thus, the Court reversed the decision of the Director and remanded it
evidence of causation without
to the hearing examiner to evaluate the competing
52
relying on the presumption of causation.
While the employer prevailed in the appeal of this case, it is important to note

that this is still a beneficial decision to workers' compensation claimants. The
Court made clear that an employer's medical evidence will be considered only
when it is detailed, well reasoned, and based on ample examination of the claimant and all relevant medical records. This decision guards against the cursory independent medical examination (IME) ordered by an employer or insurance
carrier in which a claimant is given a five minute examination and relevant medical records are ignored by an insurance carrier's "hired gun." Instead, the Court
sets a demanding and suitable standard for the "battle of the experts" in the
workers' compensation context.
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 912-13.
at 913.
at 914.

at 914-15.
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The Court had further opportunity to discuss the issue of causation and the
role of IME opinions in Young v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services.53 In July 2000, Raymond Young injured his shoulder while working for Flippo Construction Company. 54 After he notified Flippo of his injury, he
was taken to a medical facility and did not return to work. He was later fired for
reasons that were not related to his injury.5 5 Young obtained medical treatment
from several different physicians. One physician documented in a medical note
that Young was injured lifting stumps during his employment. 56 Over the next
year and a half, Young continued receiving medical treatment to recover from his
injury. Approximately two years after his injury, he submitted to an IME.57 The
physician reviewing the IME concluded that Young's condition was degenerative
58
and not related to his workplace injury.
A hearing examiner determined that in spite of the physician's opinion,
Young's condition was causally related to his workplace injury and that he was
entitled to receive payment of all medical expenses, including those for recommended surgery. 59 On Flippo's petition for review, the Director of the D.C. Department of Employment Services ("DOES") reversed the Compensation Order,
finding that Young had failed to fulfill his burden of showing by a preponderance
of the evidence that there was a causal connection between the disability and the
60
work related injury.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Director's decision and remanded the case to the agency. The Court found that the Director engaged in a
de novo review of the evidence rather than giving the proper deference to the
AL's review of all the evidence, including the live testimony of witnesses. 6 1 Instead, the Court held the Director may only reverse the ALU's decision "when it
is not supported by substantial evidence." 62 The Court concluded that the treating physician's opinion, which was based on medical examinations and tests as
well as the testimony of the claimant 6 3 was, indeed, "substantial evidence," such
that the Director could not substitute his own judgment for that of the AU. 6 4
Thus, the decision was reversed and remanded to the Director for proceedings
53 865 A.2d 535 (D.C. 2005).
54 Id. at 537.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 538.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 538-39.
60 Id. at 539.
61 Id. at 541.
62 Id. (citing Washington Vista Hotel v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Serv., 721
A.2d 574, 578 (D.C. 1998) (citations omitted)).
63 Id.
64 Id.
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consistent with that decision. 65 This Court reaffirmed deference to the ALU in
Georgetown University v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Ser-

vices,66 where the Court overturned the Director's reversal of an AL's well-reasoned findings. Those conclusions were based not only on evidence in the record,
but on the ALJ's opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses as well.67
The Court also considered an interesting case involving an allergic reaction to
chemicals used in the workplace. 68 Monique Berthault worked as a press operator for The Post. During her employment, she developed a rash that spread over
her upper body, face and head. 69 After allergy testing, her doctor determined
that she was allergic to a chemical to which she was exposed in her workplace;
when she did not work, the rash subsided, but it would reappear when she returned to work.7 ° As a result, her treating physician recommended that she not
return to work at The Post.She was subsequently forced to find employment that
71
paid her "substantially less" than what she had been earning at The Post.
Berthault initially received voluntary payments of temporary total disability benefits for a little over a year, and then began receiving temporary partial disability
benefits. 72 After an evidentiary hearing, an AL found that she continued to be
temporarily partially disabled. The Post appealed after the Director of DOES
affirmed the ALU decision.73
On appeal, The Post claimed that Berthault should only continue to receive
benefits while she continued to suffer the physical manifestations of the workplace injury, which in this case, was the appearance of a rash.74 In support of that
contention, The Post cited a line of DOES cases holding that "where a claimant's
allergic reaction to substances at the workplace causes disability, and the condition improves when claimant is removed from the environment, claimant is no
longer disabled. ' 75 As the Court pointed out, "In those cases, however ... the
claimant either had the condition prior to its exacerbation in the work environment, or was unable to establish a casual relation between the injury and employment." 7 6 Thus, "[w]hen a claimant suffers a wage loss due to circumstances at the
workplace that is not based upon a pre-existing condition and cannot return to
65
66
67
68
2004).
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id.
862 A.2d 387 (D.C. 2004).
Id. at 391-93.
Washington Post v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Serv., 853 A.2d 704 (D.C.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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with her abilities,
either her prior employment or employment commensurate
77
temporary partial disability benefits may be awarded."
In Berthault's case, there was medical proof to show that her injury was related to her duties as a press operator. Additionally, she had never experienced
an allergic reaction to the chemical prior to working at The Post and the allergic
condition disappeared when she was away from the printing press. 78 Moreover,
The Post did not find her alternative suitable employment.7 9 Thus, since the
claimant's condition was clearly related to her employment, and she could neither
return to her prior employment nor earn as much income as she did at The Post,
she suffered and continued to suffer from a disability. Therefore, Berthault was
entitled to receive temporary partial disability benefits.8 °
In a tight job market, this decision is especially good news for those who suffer
illness related to their particular workplaces. Because it is more difficult to secure
employment, those who must accept "under-employment" in order to be gainfully employed in an environment that does not make them ill can still receive
partial workers' compensation in order to compensate for the salary loss suffered
by the under-employment. Simultaneously, the decision is also favorable for employers because it allows the employer or its insurance carrier to insist upon mitigation of damages by a claimant, who should seek employment elsewhere once
the illness caused by the job dissipates.
In addition to addressing substantive issues in the field of workers' compensation law, the Court also addressed a number of procedural issues that arose in
workers' compensation cases. In Orius Telecommunications, Inc. v. Districtof Columbia Department of Employment Services,81 the Court considered the circumstances under which an employee was entitled to a late payment penalty from the
employee's workers' compensation carrier. 82 On July 29, 2002, an AiU entered
an order to award Carvellas Sellers workers' compensation benefits for back injuries he suffered while working for Orius Telecommunications. 83 A certificate of
service reflecting this order was sent to the attorneys for both Orius and Sellers
on July 30, 2002. Liberty Mutual, Orius' insurance carrier, mailed the award
check to Sellers on August 9 or 10, 2002, and Sellers received the check on August 13, 2002.84
Sellers later petitioned the ALJ to assess a twenty percent penalty against
Orius and Sellers for failure to pay the compensation award within the ten-day
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 707-08.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 706, 708.
857 A.2d 1061 (D.C. 2004).
Id. at 1063.
Id.
Id. at 1063-64.
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time limit prescribed in D.C. Code section 32-1515(f). 85 The ALU denied Sellers'
motion because Liberty Mutual had issued the check on the tenth day 'of the
order, but the Director of DOES reversed the decision, holding that the dispositive date was not the date on which the check was issued, but the date on which it
was received. Thus, because Sellers did not receive the 8check
until August 13,
6
2002, Liberty Mutual did not meet the ten-day deadline.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Director's decision, interpreting section 321515(f) for the first time.87 In so holding, the Court referred to Jaime v. Districtof
Columbia Department of Employment Services,88 an unemployment benefits
case, in which the Court interpreted the word "paid" to mean money "actually
received.", 89 The Court was also persuaded by a line of cases from the U.S. Department of Labor Benefits Review Board, which construed identical language in
the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation9 1Act9' to indicate that
money is "not 'paid' until it is received by the claimant."
The Jaime decision is a great victory for workers' compensation claimants.
When an individual is injured on the job and, if he or she does not receive compensation benefits in a timely manner, it could easily cause the individual to fall
behind personal finances, such as payment of important bills. This reality is especially true for low-wage workers who live on the margins in this expensive urban
area. The Court created a strong incentive for employers and insurance carriers
to fulfill their workers' compensation obligations in a timely manner.
In Sodexho Marriot Corporation v. District of Columbia Department of Em-

ployment Services,92 the Court considered whether a workers' compensation
claim was barred by a one-year statute of limitations if the claimant requested
modification of benefits where both the employer and claimant signed a stipulation for payments. 93 Claimant Trevor Rasbury sustained a back injury while
working for Sodexho in May of 1998. 9' In April of 1999, the parties signed a
stipulation in which Sodexho agreed to pay for Rasbury's temporary total disability for two specific time periods in the previous year and an amount to cover
treatment received for the injury. The DOES Office of Workers' Compensation
95
approved the stipulation and the agreed-upon amounts were paid in full.
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id. at 1064; D.C. CODE § 32-1515(f) (2001).
Orius Telecomm., 857 A.2d at 1064-65.
Id. at 1066.
486 A.2d 692 (D.C. 1985).
Orius Telecomm., 857 A.2d at 1066 (citing Jaime, 486 A.2d at 693-94).
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 (2001).
Orius Telecomm., 857 A.2d at 1067 (citations omitted).
858 A.2d 452 (D.C. 2004).
Id. at 453.
Id.
Id.
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In 2001, Rasbury filed a new claim for scheduled loss benefits for permanent
partial disability resulting from the 1998 injury. In March 2001, the ALU denied
the claim because the claimant had not yet achieved "maximum medical improvement. '96 In June 2002, after undergoing surgery to correct her injury, Rasbury filed an application for a formal hearing requesting temporary total
disability benefits. 97 Sodexho argued that Rasbury's claim was time-barred under
the D.C. Code section 32-1524.98 The AL disagreed and issued a compensation
order granting Rasbury's request, which was affirmed by the Director of DOES
99
and the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the AL's decision. The Court found that the
Director was reasonable and within his legal boundaries in asserting that D.C.

Code section 32-1524(c) 1°° required a compensation order to exist before the
limitation period begins to run for a requested modification claim. 10 1 The Court
also agreed with the Director's determination that the settlement between
Sodexho and Rasbury did not fulfill the requirement of a compensation order as
there was substantial evidence showing that the stipulation contemplated a possibility of future claims and therefore, was not a complete and final settlement of a

claim. 10 2 Thus, the settlement constituted a voluntary payment of benefits and
did not trigger the one-year limitations period in section 32-1524.103

As with most of the workers' compensation decisions that came out of the
Court of Appeals this past year, this decision relies on a literal reading of the
D.C. Code provisions that govern the workers' compensation system. This ap96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 454. D.C. Code § 32-1524(a) provides, in relevant part:
At any time prior to 1 year after the date of the last payment of compensation or at any time
prior to 1 year after the rejection of a claim, provided, however, that in the case of a claim
filed pursuant to § 32-1508(a)(3)(V) the time period shall be at any time prior to 3 years after
the date of the last payment of compensation or at any time prior to 3 years after the rejection of a claim, the Mayor may, upon his own initiative or upon application of a party in
interest, order a review of a compensation case pursuant to the procedures provided in § 321520 where there is reason to believe that a change of conditions has occurred which raises
issues concerning:
(1) The fact or the degree of disability or the amount of compensation payable pursuant
thereto; or
(2) The fact of eligibility or the amount of compensation payable pursuant to § 32-1509.
D.C. CODE § 32-1524(a) (2001).
99 Sodexho, 858 A.2d at 453-54, 457.
100 D.C. CODE § 32-1524(c) (2001) ("Upon the completion of a review conducted pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section, the Mayor shall issue a new compensation order which may terminate,
continue, reinstate, increase or decrease such compensation previously paid, or award
compensation.").
101 Sodexho, 858 A.2d at 455.
102 Id. at 455-56.
103 Id. at 456.
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proach should give claimants and employers comfort in that it is predictable and
ensures that all involved in the system have a clear understanding of their responsibilities, how to protect their rights, and how to limit their liability to the extent
possible.
Generally, a workers' compensation claimant must give notice of his injury to
his employer within thirty days of the injury in order to file a claim for workers'
compensation. 0 4 In Washington Hospital Center v. District of Columbia DepartCourt provides greater guidance on when
ment of Employment Services,'0 510the
6

the 30 day period begins to run.
Claimant Anita Jones worked for Washington Hospital Center ("WHC") as a
custodial employee for over thirty years.1" 7 In July of 1999, she was diagnosed
with mesothelioma, a type of cancer that has multiple possible causes, including
prolonged exposure to smoke and asbestos. 10 8 Jones was granted a medical leave
of absence to have surgery to remove the cancer, but failed to respond to a question on the form, which asked whether she had a work-related injury or illness.' 0 9
After the surgery, Jones retained counsel and on October 19, 1999, she filed a
notice requesting compensation arising specifically from the cancer." 0 On February 14, 2000, in response to a subpoena, Jones' attorney received WHC reports
documenting the presence of asbestos in its buildings."' Both an ALJ and the
Director of DOES found that Jones had given timely notice of her work related
2
injury."
The Court of Appeals affirmed the DOES decision and held that Jones was
unaware of the relationship between her cancer and her employment until February 14, 2000, when she received the reports documenting her exposure to asbestos
through discovery. 113 Section 32-1513(a) of the workers' compensation code requires notice be made within thirty days of the time that a claimant "is aware or
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been aware" of the relationship between the injury or illness and work. 1 4 The Court held that although
Jones may have suspected that asbestos exposure could have been the cause of
104 D.C. CODE § 32-1513(a) (2001). But see Safeway Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep't
of Employment Serv., 832 A.2d 1267, 1271 (D.C. 2003) (noting that "claims for causally related medical expenses are not barred by the failure of the employee to give the notice required by D.C. Code
§ 32-1513 (2001)").
105 859 A.2d 1058 (D.C. 2004).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1059.
108 Id. at 1060 (finding Claimant's husband was a heavy smoker and she herself worked in a
building that has asbestos).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1061.
113 Id. at 1062.
114 D.C. CODE § 32-1513(a) (2001); see supra note 104.
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her cancer, she did not have evidence of a causal relationship between her job
and the cancer until she received the reports from WHC confirming the presence

of asbestos in the building where she worked.1 15 In so holding, the Court explicitly rejected WHC's argument that the mere possibility of the causal relationship
was sufficient to begin the thirty-day notice requirement. In addition, the Court
explicitly rejected the findings of Robinson v. Washington Hospital Center, an
administrative decision issued by a DOES ALJ, which stood for the incorrect

proposition that the mere possibility of causation 1triggered
the time requirement
6
to report an injury or illness to one's employer.'
This decision is not surprising and mirrors the approach used in negligence
cases as well the discovery rule. Well accepted in the context of torts and personal

injury, this concept was explicitly imported into the workers' compensation code
and consistently applied by the Court of Appeals.
The final workers' compensation case reported by the Court of Appeals in the
last year involved a controversial issue of attorney's fees and when those fees
may be collected. 1 7 Claimant Veronica Gourzong-Rose sought and received

temporary total disability benefits for back injuries she sustained during her employment with Providence Hospital."1 8 She filed another claim for additional

benefits that was initially rejected, but later granted after a hearing."1 9 The claimant also petitioned for Providence to pay her attorney's fees pursuant to D.C.
Code section 32-1530(b),' 2 ° which the AJ granted and the Director affirmed. 2 1
115 Id. at 1063.
116 Id. at 1062 n.4 (citing Robinson v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., OHA No. 00-398B, OWC No.
554069, 2002 DC Wkr. Comp. LEXIS 107 (May 16, 2004)).
117 Providence Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Serv., 855 A.2d 1108 (D.C.
2004).
118 Id.at 1110.
119 Id.
120 D.C. Code § 32-1530(b) provides, in relevant part:
[I]f the employer or carrier pays or tenders payment of compensation without an award pursuant to this chapter, and thereafter, a controversy develops over the amount of additional
compensation, if any, to which the employee may be entitled, the Mayor shall recommend in
writing a disposition of the controversy. If the employer or carrier refuses to accept such
written recommendation, within 14 days after its receipt by them, they shall pay or tender to
the employee in writing the additional compensation, if any, to which they believe the employee is entitled. If the employee refuses to accept such payment or tender of compensation
and thereafter utilizes the services of any attorney-at-law, an if the compensation thereafter
awarded is greater than the amount paid or tendered by the employer or carrier, a reasonable attorney's fee based solely upon the difference between the amount awarded and the
amount tendered or paid shall be awarded in addition to the amount of compensation.... If
the claimant is successful in review proceedings before the Mayor or court in any such case,
an award may be made in favor of the claimant and against the employer or carrier for a
reasonable attorney's fee for claimant's counsel in accordance with the above provisions. In
all other cases any claim for legal services shall not be assessed against the employer or
carrier.
D.C. CODE § 32-1530(b) (2001).
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The Court of Appeals reversed the ALJ's order, holding that the plain mean122
ing of section 32-1530 did not authorize the claimant to recover attorney's fees.
In so doing, the Court relied on its previous decision in National Geographic
Society v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services,12 3 where it

held that D.C. Code section 32-1530(b) was a clear and unambiguous statute and
that it must be read literally. 124 Based on the plain language of this section, the
Court ruled that the "clear and unambiguous" meaning of the statute allows the
claimant to collect fees only if the employer rejects the Mayor's written recommendation. Here, the claimant, not the employer, refused the recommendation,
thus Gourzang-Rose was not entitled to fees. 125 Therefore, section 32-1530(b)
only "authorizes an award of attorney's fees when the express conditions of the
statute are met, including the employer's rejection of the Mayor's written recommendation in the case.' 126 Although this decision likely disappoints the claimants' representatives in the workers' compensation bar, it mirrors the Court's
literal approach used in the Sodexho case and should be studied carefully by this
group of practitioners.
Ill. OMCE OF EMPLOYEE APPEALS

The Court of Appeals has also had occasion to examine a number of decisions
arising from the D.C. Office of Employee Appeals (OEA). The vast majority of
adverse employment actions suffered by D.C. government employees have administrative remedies available through the OEA and its processes. Thus, there is
ample opportunity for the Court of Appeals to examine these cases each year.
One such case is White v. District of Columbia.127 Chester White retired from
the federal government to take a position with D.C.'s Office of Inspector General. 128 White expected to receive both the federal annuity he had accrued from
129
his years of work with the federal government as well as his full D.C. salary.
Federal law, however, precludes employees from "double-dipping" in this manner 130 and, as a result, White's D.C. salary was offset by his annuity. 13 1 White
filed a claim before the Superior Court alleging that before he accepted the position, the Inspector General had falsely told him that she had obtained a waiver
121 Providence Hosp., 855 A.2d at 1111.
122 Id. at 1113.
123 721 A.2d 618 (D.C. 1998).
124 Nat'l Geographic, 721 A.2d at 620-21.
125 Providence Hosp., 855 A.2d at 1113-14 (referring to Nat'l Geographic, 721 A.2d at 619).
126 Id. at 1114; Nat'l Geographic, 721 A.2d at 621.
127 852 A.2d 922 (D.C. 2004).
128 White, 852 A.2d at 923.
129 Id.
130 See 5 U.S.C. § 8344(a)(2004); see also 5 C.F.R. § 837.303(a)(2004) (federal law relating to
"double-dipping"). See footnote 2 of the White case for the application of these laws to D.C. law.
131 White, 852 A.2d at 923.
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from the federal government of the offset provision. 132 The judge stayed the action to allow White to pursue his administrative remedy under the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA), and White filed an appeal with the Office of
1 33
Employee Appeals (OEA).
At that time, the Court notes, "there had been no final action by an agency
from which an 'appeal' could be taken," and one year later, the OEA Senior
Administrative Judge issued an "Order to Employee Regarding Jurisdiction,"
which found that White should have filed a grievance over this salary dispute, and
until such time a grievance was filed, the OEA had no jurisdiction over the "appeal.' 1 34 The OEA ordered White to show proof that he filed a grievance, and
after he failed to do so, the ALJ formally ruled that the OEA had no jurisdiction
over White's case. However, the ALJ stated that if White did file a grievance, and
the Agency denied the relief requested, then White could invoke the jurisdiction
of OEA. t35 Instead of seeking review of the ALJ's decision or filing the grievance, White returned to Superior Court and had the stay lifted so that his case
could proceed to trial. At trial, a jury found in favor of the District and the former D.C. Inspector General, and White appealed.' 3 6
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District's argument that White had to
file a grievance with the Office of Inspector General seeking administrative relief
under the CMPA. 137 The Court further reasoned that, under the CMPA, White
could have filed a grievance even though the alleged misrepresentation was made
before White started in his new position. 1 38 Finally, even if there was a question
as to whether White's claim really fell under the CMPA, he still was required to
file a grievance pursuant to the CMPA. 13 9 The Court has held in the past that "if
a substantial question exists as to whether the CMPA applies, the Act's procedures must be followed and the claim must initially be submitted to the appropriate District agency .... A substantial question arises unless the injury is clearly
not compensable under [the] CMPA . . . [and t]he determination whether the
OEA has jurisdiction is quintessentially a decision for the OEA to make in the
first instance."' 140 Thus, because White failed to file a grievance, he therefore
132
133

Id.
Id.; D.C. CODE §§ 1.601.01, 1.601.02. (2001), formerly D.C. CODE § 1.601.1 -.2 (1992 Repl.).
White, 852 A.2d at 923-24.
Id. at 924.
Id. at 925.
Id.
Id. (citing Grillo v. District of Columbia, 731 A.2d 384, 386 (D.C. 1999) (internal citations

134
135
136
137
138
omitted)).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 925-26 (citing Grillo, 731 A.2d at 386 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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waived1 his rights to any remedies that would have otherwise been available to
14
him.
As this case demonstrates, when a government employee believes he or she
has suffered an illegal personnel action, the individual must consult relevant regulations, statutes and personnel documents to determine how that action may be
remedied. While government employees have far greater employment protections than private sector employees, the mechanisms by which they can protect
their rights are often tightly circumscribed, and rarely involve resorting to the
courts.
The case of Districtof Columbia v. Fremeau142 presents some interesting issues
regarding review of OEA decisions. 143 The employee in this case, James
Fremeau, was a Communications Operator for the D.C. Fire Department. 144 The
Department issued a proposed letter of removal to Fremeau for "inefficiency"
and "negligent or careless work performance. 14 5 This stemmed from an incident
in which Fremeau received a phone call requesting an ambulance. Although the
caller never reported that he was intoxicated, Fremeau assumed the caller was
indeed intoxicated and ordered a detoxification unit to respond instead of a medical unit. Moreover, when Fremeau called the dispatcher to send the unit, he was
sarcastic and unprofessional about the potential needs of the caller, again assuming he was drunk rather than experiencing a more serious health crisis.1 6 The
removal letter further stated that as a result of failing to receive the proper medi14 7
cal attention from a medical unit, the caller died of cardiac arrest.
Fremeau requested and received a hearing challenging his removal. At the
hearing, both the Fire Department and Fremeau presented evidence. 14 8 After the
initial hearing, the case was re-assigned to another hearing examiner before a
final written decision was issued. The case was then referred to an ALJ who upheld the proposed removal. 14 9 Fremeau appealed to the OEA, claiming lack of
substantial evidence to uphold the Fire Department's decision, but the OEA af150
firmed the AL's decision.
Upon petition from Fremeau, the Superior Court reversed and remanded the
OEA's decision for a new evidentiary hearing, which would be presented before
one AU who would both hear the evidence and issue a decision in the case. 151
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Id. at 927.
869 A.2d 711 (D.C. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 712.
Id.
Id. at 712-13.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 713-14.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 716.
Id. at 716-17.

THE EMPLOYMENT LAW YEAR IN REVIEW JUNE 2004-JUNE 2005

225

After both parties' motions for reconsideration were denied, both appealed to
52
the D.C. Court of Appeals.'
In addressing the first issue, whether the substitution of the hearing examiner
warranted a new evidentiary hearing, the Court affirmed the trial court's finding
that Fremeau waived his objection to the administrative judge's decision to decide his case without a new evidentiary hearing. 153 The Court further ruled that
even if Fremeau had not waived this objection, a new evidentiary hearing is not
necessary if the "agency can demonstrate that the credibility of witnesses plays no
part in the agency's decision"1 54 In Fremeau's case, the relevant evidence was
undisputed and credibility of the witnesses played no part in the agency's deci155
sion, and, therefore, a new hearing was not required in this matter.
Fremeau also challenged the OEA's decision on grounds that it was "arbitrary" and "capricious" and that there was not substantial evidence to support its
conclusion.1 56 The Court affirmed the OEA's conclusion, finding substantial evidence exists to support the decision to terminate Fremeau's employment with the
Fire Department.157 This evidence included tape recordings of the incoming
phone call to Fremeau, and his call to the police dispatcher in which he was sarcastic and dismissive of the caller's medical condition. Moreover, Fremeau admitted that he was sarcastic during this incident and that his testimony regarding the
facts of what happened corroborated all the allegations against him.1 58 Under
these circumstances, the Court rejected Fremeau's claim that there was no substantial evidence to support his discharge and that the decision to remove him
159
was arbitrary and capricious.
In a case involving the termination of a District government employee, the
Court issued a decision in favor of the employee. Mark Levitt held a "career
service" position with the D.C. Department of Corrections, until he was appointed to an "excepted service" position in April 1997.16° In July, 1999, this
position was eliminated and he was re-appointed to a "career service" position in
the D.C. Office of Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining. 161 Levitt alleged
that he did not have any supervisory responsibilities in the newly created position. As a result, the position "effectively put [him] in a one-of-a-kind competi152 Id. at 717.
153 Id. at 718.
154 Id. at 717-19 (citing Stevens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Comm'n on Human Rights, 498 A.2d 546, 550
(D.C. 1985)).
155 Id. at 719.
156 Id. at 716.
157 Id. at 720-21.
158 Id. at 720.
159 Id. at 721.
160 Levitt v. District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals, 869 A.2d 364, 365 (D.C. 2005).
161 Id.
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tive level" and he was given an assignment that only lasted one month. 162 Levitt
requested that the OEA hold a hearing and authorize discovery, but the OEA
denied Levitt's request, finding that D.C. Code section 1-624.08(f) precluded him
from reviewing an agency's decision to abolish a specific position, unless the employee was "not afforded the one round of lateral competition to which he is
entitled for positions within the employee's competitive level.", 163 Although Levitt did not contend that this exception applied to his case, he argued that the
agency took unusual steps before abolishing his position: "[T]he employing
agency first transferring him, after a number of years in a career service position,
to the excepted service, and, then, transferring him out of the excepted service
and back to a newly-created career service supervisory position with no one to
supervise; and then, a few weeks later, abolishing the very position it had specifically created for him.'

64

The Court of Appeals ruled that in order to challenge the elimination of a
position, an employee must advance a "non-frivolous" argument in order to warrant a hearing. 165 In the instant case, the Court concluded that Levitt's claims
were indeed non-frivolous and that he was entitled to conduct discovery and have
a hearing.166 The Court agreed with Levitt, finding the District did not produce
sufficient evidence to explain why it abolished a position created for him just a
few weeks earlier. Under these particular circumstances, the Court agreed that
Levitt's challenge to his termination was "non-frivolous" and remanded the case
to the OEA for discovery and a hearing. 167 Therefore, if a personnel act smells
this fishy, the OEA should let the aggrieved employee go fishing to find out what
really happened.
The final OEA appeal heard by the Court of Appeals during its last term involved an examination of the type of evidence the OEA could consider when
reviewing an AL's order regarding an employee's discharge. Ellsworth Colbert
was discharged from his position with the Department of Public Works (DPW)
because of alleged "inexcusable neglect of duty" and insubordination.' 68 While
he did not contest the charges levied against him, Colbert challenged the severity
162 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
163 Id. at 365-66; D.C. CODE § 1-624.08(f) (2001).
164 Levitt, 869 A.2d at 366.
165 Id. at 366 (citing Anjuwan v. District of Columbia Dep't of Pub. Works, 729 A.2d 883, 88586 (D.C. 1998)).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 366-67.
168 District of Columbia Dep't of Public Works v. Colbert, 874 A.2d 353, 355 n.1 (D.C. 2005)
(noting that the allegations against Colbert, which included threatening a supervisor, failure to comply with various work rules, and insubordination by refusing to follow a supervisor's direct order,
could not be relied upon because Colbert was not given timely notice of its intent to impose discipline
for this incident).
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of the sanction. 6 9 Colbert argued that the ALJ had relied on impermissible evidence and did not properly evaluate all relevant factors when reaching its decision to terminate Colbert. 170 On appeal from DPW, the OEA first ruled that it
was not clear whether DPW evaluated all potential mitigating evidence and remanded the case back for consideration. The DPW then submitted a report to the
OEA supporting its decision and attached twenty documents that were not previously submitted to the ALJ.17 1 Based on this supplemented record, the OEA
affirmed the DPW's dismissal of Colbert. However, the Superior Court set aside
the OEA's decision and ordered his reinstatement, finding that the decision to
172
discharge Colbert was not substantially supported by permissible evidence.
On appeal, the Court found that the OEA exceeded its proper scope of review
when it considered the supplemented record and documents not presented to the
ALJ.173 Moreover, the OEA's scope of review is to determine whether the ALJ's
decision was supported by substantial evidence. Rather than doing that in this
case, the Court held that the OEA "posited its own unidentified body of substan1 74
tial evidence in support of DPW's decision.'
The Court also determined that the AU improperly rejected evidence proffered by the DPW from Colbert's personnel file regarding Colbert's previous
conduct at work. This evidence was relevant to the question of his overall fitness
to continue in his position and included such factors as job performance, interactions with co-workers, and reliability. 1 75 Thus, this case was ultimately remanded
to the AJ for further proceedings and consideration of all the relevant
1 76
evidence.
Furthermore, this case highlights the importance of D.C. government employees being aware of the contents of their personnel files. Good reviews, evaluations and letters of commendation should be saved in one's own personal files.
Negative reviews or reprimands should also be saved, but when that is not possible, the employee should make detailed notes of such documents and what they
contain. Data in a government employee's personnel file rarely disappears, and
being involved in litigation or a dispute is not the time for an employee to recreate what is in his or her file. If employees maintain their records, they will be
better prepared to challenge unfavorable personnel actions if such incidents
should arise.
169 Id. at 355.
170 Id. at 355-57.
171 Id. at 357.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 358-59 (citing D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 6, § 630.1 (1999) and D.C. MUN. REos. tit. 6,
§ 631.1 (1999), which provide that a record is closed at the end of an evidentiary hearing and can only
be reopened under circumstances which were not present in this case).
174 Id. at 360.
175 Id. at 359.
176 Id. at 361.
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IV.

MISCELLANEOUS EMPLOYMENT CASES

The remaining employment cases decided by the Court of Appeals between
June 2004 and June 2005 defy easy categorization. Grouping them in this miscellaneous category is not meant to diminish the importance of these decisions and
their applicability to a wide range of workers in the District.
The first case in this section was brought as a class action by a group of Metropolitan Police officers who retired because of disability. 177 The officers claimed
that they were entitled to a five percent pension increase pursuant to a settlement
between the District and the Fraternal Order of Police in 1993.178 However, the
explicit terms of the settlement, as approved by the D.C. Council, stated that this
five percent increase was available only to a retiree "who has completed or completes twenty years of service .
,,.79 None of the officers worked for the Department for twenty years prior to disability retirement. 180 Consistent with its
treatment of the workers' compensation code, the Court gave full credence to the
clear and unambiguous language of the settlement agreement. The Court also
suggested that the officers, who retired because of disability prior to their twentyyear anniversary of service, should appeal to their union and the D.C. Council.' 8'
The Court ruled on another case dealing with disability retirement of a public
safety officer, but in this instance, Bausch v. District of Columbia Police and
82
Firefighters' Retirement and Relief Board,' only one individual was involved. 183
Christopher Bausch, a firefighter, suffered several injuries to his back and knees
over the course of his employment, making it impossible for him to fulfill his
duties as a firefighter. 184 The Board of Police and Fire Surgeons recommended
that the Retirement Board consider Bausch for disability retirement. After an
evidentiary hearing, the Board agreed that he was entitled to receive a disability
retirement annuity equivalent to 40% of his basic salary.' 85 The Board calculated
this figure, which is the minimum retirement annuity available, by comparing
Bausch's basic salary as a firefighter with "the basic salary for the position he...
has the capacity to occupy while in disability retirement.' i8 6 In the end, the
Board determined that Bausch qualified for four jobs: part-time shopkeeper, full177
178
179
180
181
182

District of Columbia v. Gould, 852 A.2d 50 (D.C. 2004).

183
184
185
186

Id.
Id. at 1123.
Id.
Id. (quoting D.C. MUN. REOS. tit. 7, § 2515.3(b)(2) (1986)).

Id. at 53.
Id. at 53 n.3.
Id.
Id. at 54, 57.
855 A.2d 1121 (D.C. 2004).
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187
time library technician, full-time library aide, and full- time receptionist.
Bausch appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals.' 88
The Court ruled in Bausch's favor, holding that the Board did not have substantial evidence to support its findings that Bausch was qualified for all four jobs
or that they were all available.1 89 With respect to the shopkeeper position, once
the Board determined that Bausch was qualified for this position, it simply
doubled the part-time salary to a full-time salary to reach its annuity calculation,
irrespective as to whether a full-time position actually existed.1 90 The Court
found error with this method because there was no market evidence that such a
full-time position was actually available at the time that the calculation was
made. 19 '
The library positions both involved "occasional stooping" - a function which
Bausch was unable to perform, according to undisputed medical opinions. Thus,
the Court also held that these positions were not appropriately figured into the
annuity calculation. 192 Furthermore, with regard to the receptionist position, the
Court held that there was an open receptionist position for which Bausch was
qualified at the time of the annuity determination. Therefore, the Board's conclusion was proper.' 93 The Court thus reversed the Board's determination and remanded the case to re-calculate Bausch's annuity in a manner consistent with
their opinion. 194 In so holding, the Court engaged in fact specific and detailed
findings, demonstrating the Board's duty to protect disabled public safety
officers.
The next case illustrates the complexity of the various personnel laws applicable to government employees and the importance for these employees and their
attorneys to have a firm understanding of the laws that govern their service.
Belva Newsome was the Chief ALJ of the District of Columbia's Department of
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs. She was removed from that position for nondisciplinary reasons, and subsequently filed suit over her dismissal. 195 One of her
claims alleged that her appointment was made under the Civil Service Reform
Act (CSRA), and that she was entitled to the employment protections afforded
to federal employees.1 96 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument by relying
on a literal interpretation of the statute and implementing regulations. The Court
noted that the CSRA and its regulations referred to the appointment of an ALJ

187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1124-25.
Id. at 1124.
Id.
Id. at 1125.
Id.
Id.
Newsome v. District of Columbia, 859 A.2d 630, 631 (D.C. 2004).
Id. at 632.
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to
by an "agency," which was defined by the U.S. Code and relevant regulations
' 97
specifically exclude "the government of the District of Columbia."'
Newsome also claimed that section 3105 of the CSRA was personnel legislation as specified in section 714(c) of the District of Columbia's Self-Government
Act and Governmental Reorganization Act. Therefore, section 3105 of the
CSRA gave her a protected status and was not superseded by the District's Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA).' 9 8 However, the Court held section
never applied to District employees and affirmed the dis3105 by its very terms
199
missal of the claim.
The final two decisions issued by the Court involve a review of arbitration
decisions. These decisions are significant to employment law practitioners. In recent years, arbitration agreements, where employers and employees prospectively agree to arbitrate any potential disputes, have become increasingly
popular. Employers seek arbitration agreements because they help to control litigation costs. Although they are viewed to be more beneficial to employers, there
are benefits for employees as well. Arbitration proceedings are far less formal
and easier to handle without retaining an attorney. The entire process may be
concluded in a matter of months, as opposed to litigation that can last for years.
Regardless of who benefits from any particular arbitration agreement, they are
increasingly common, and the standards for judicial review are extremely narrow.
In Olivarius v. Stanley J. Sarnoff Endowment for Cardiovascular Science,

Inc., 200 Ann McAllister Olivarius was employed by The Stanley J. Samoff Endowment for Cardiovascular Science, Inc. (the Endowment) as its President,
CEO, and General Counsel when the Board of Directors terminated her employment for cause.20 1 Pursuant to her employment contract containing a mandatory
arbitration clause, Olivarius submitted the matter to arbitration, which resulted in
a sixty-seven page opinion. The arbitrator ruled that the Endowment had "ample
cause" to terminate her employment, listing many actions which amounted to a
breach of her fiduciary obligations to the Endowment.2 °2 After the Superior
Court denied Olivarius' motion to vacate the award, Olivarius did not appeal.20 3
Sixteen months later, Olivarius filed a motion requesting the Superior Court to
vacate the arbitration award as well as its confirmation of the judgment. She argued her motion on the basis of a letter proving that the Endowment terminated
her without cause. Allegedly, the letter was a document that the Endowment
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failed to produce during discovery. 20 4 As a result, Olivarius claimed that the Endowment won its arbitration award by fraud and, consequently, the court should
be allowed to vacate the award under the Maryland Arbitration Act. 20 5 The court
denied the motion as untimely, and Olivarius appealed.20 6
On appeal, Olivarius argued that Maryland law should apply to her case as
stipulated in her employment contract.20 7 However, the Court of Appeals interpreted this case in a different procedural posture. The Court did not view this
case solely as a motion to vacate an award, but as a motion for relief from the
Superior Court's initial denial of her motion to vacate. 208 Although Maryland
substantive law may have controlled in Olivarius's initial proceedings to vacate
the award, the procedural law of the tribunal in which she chose to proceed governed this matter. 20 9 Thus, because Olivarius neither timely appealed nor moved
for relief from judgment under Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), she
could not revive her claim sixteen months after the original dismissal, unless she
expressly met the requirements of Rule 60(b).2 10
Further addressing the issue, the Court determined that Olivarius could not
invoke Rule 60(b).21 1 Specifically, the Court held that she could not revive her
claim based on "mistake," "newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial," or "fraud" because the one-year limit had elapsed by the time she moved to vacate the arbitration award and the December 1999 judgment in April of 2001.212 Moreover,
Olivarius could not invoke the provision allowing the Court to "entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment" because it is available "only
to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice." The Court found that even if her allegations were true, they did not rise to that standard. 213 Finally, the Court noted
that in order to invoke relief under Rule 60(b), Olivarius needed to prove that
she was "absen[t] of fault or negligence" in failing to move for relief in a timely
manner. However, because Olivarius was the author of the letter she believed
proved the Endowment's fraudulent behavior, she waived the right to raise this
argument because she did not raise an objection during the arbitration and when
she first moved for the Superior Court to vacate the award.2 14
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The Court of Appeals was similarly unwilling to vacate an arbitration award in
the case of Shore v. Groom Law Group.215 Appellant Linda Shore was a partner
at Groom Law Group until the firm requested her resignation.2 16 While at
Groom, Shore had difficulty interacting with her colleagues and clients and on
several occasions, Shore expressed her interest in leaving the firm to seek what
she considered to be a better work environment.2 17 Clients also requested that
Shore be removed from cases, stating that she was "out of control" and used
profane language.2 18 The final decision to terminate Shore occurred after she told
one of the firm's clients that she was seeking another job because the firm "had
difficulty accepting women in leadership roles., 2 19 After learning about Shore's
comment, the firm's executive committee decided that she should be terminated,
and, shortly thereafter, Shore agreed to resign. 2 °
About eleven months after she left Groom, Shore's attorney invoked the arbitration clause of her employment agreement, raising issues of gender and disability discrimination, retaliation, defamation, tortuous interference with business
relationships, invasion of privacy, breach of contract, and violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 221 After an eight-day hearing,
the arbitration panel ruled that Groom did not violate any law or contractual
right when it released Shore from the firm. However, the arbitration panel found
that Groom discriminated against her "in the manner and terms of

. .

. [her]

separation from the firm." 222 Thus, the panel awarded Shore damages for the
period when she was between jobs, some deferred compensation she was already
owed, and costs associated with the arbitration, but not attorney's fees.22 3
The next day, Shore filed a motion for reconsideration of her award with the
arbitration panel and also filed a motion in Superior Court seeking to affirm in
part and modify in part the arbitration award.224 Both the panel and the Superior
Court denied her motions.22 5 She then filed a motion to reconsider with the Superior Court, arguing for the first time that she had been released for engaging in
activity protected by the Civil Rights Act. The court denied this motion and dis226
missed the case with prejudice.
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Again, Shore filed a motion with the arbitration panel alleging that Groom
still owed her some deferred compensation, but the panel ruled in Groom's favor.
Shore filed yet another motion in Superior Court, seeking to have all three of the
panel's rulings vacated, arguing that the panel engaged in misconduct by receiving ex parte evidence. 22 7 After the Court denied her motions yet again, Shore
filed an appeal.22 s
The Court began by reaffirming the very limited circumstances under which it
could modify an arbitration order: "only on grounds clearly specified by statute,"
if "the arbitration panel is found to have ruled on matters beyond the scope of its
229
authority," or if the panel "manifestly disregarded the law."
In summary, the Court found none of these circumstances present in this case.
It affirmed the denial of attorney's fees because Shore was only successful on one
of her eight claims.230 Moreover, the money awarded was proper because Shore
quickly found a new job relatively quickly, and at that point, her damages
stopped accruing. 231 The Court also affirmed the arbitration panel's application
of Title VII to Groom's claims of gender and disability discrimination and
retaliation.2 3 2

Finally, the Court addressed Shore's allegations that the panel engaged in ex
parte communications with Groom, but the Court did not find any evidentiary
support for these allegations.23 3 As a result, the Court found no basis for setting
aside the arbitration award and all the orders of the Superior Court denying her
various motions for relief were affirmed.234
CONCLUSION

While there may not have been any groundbreaking decisions from the D.C.
Court of Appeals from June 2004 through June 2005, the summary of the decisions issued during that period shows that the Court dealt with many primary
issues of employment law. Thus, the Court demonstrated its mindfulness of the
protections afforded to workers under the employment laws, and its concern with
a close and literal reading of statutes and regulations whenever possible. More
interesting issues may follow in future years, but for this term, the Court issued
decisions that will help workers and employers have greater certainty in their
relations and dealings with each other.
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